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ABSTRACT 
Life extension of high cost components until measurable damage is detected can result in marked re 
ductions in total cycle costs. The life extension strategy for turbine disks is based upon nondestruc-
tive inspection to detect defects, usage and stress analysis to define requirements, and fracture me-
chanics analysis and testing to evaluate the severity of any defects under future usage. Because there 
are uncertainties and inaccuracies in the inspection, analysis, testing and definition of past and 
future usage, the selection of the optimum life extension strategy requires quantitative evaluation 
of the costs and risks associated with each uncertainty during life extension. This paper summarizes 
recent developments in the basic methodologies necessary to quantify reliability. Specific examples 
are described which illustrate the concepts and payoff possible as well as the relative importance of 
inspection, analysis, and usage uncertainties on the optimum life extension strategy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Engineering components in high performance 
equipment may wear out due to fatigue or creep. 
Historically such components have been designed 
for replacement after a specified amount of service. 
The "specific design life" is that beyond which a 
significant number of failures are predicted to 
occur by analysis, lab testing and operating expe·· 
rience. Because however, there is significant 
variability in the loading conditions and the 
materials response, most nominally identical compo-
nents could provide reliable service well beyond 
the "design life", but all components are retired 
because the precise amount of damage accumulation 
is not established for each. Figure l shows a 
typical variation in the actual life of nominally 
identical components. Because so much of the use-
ful life of most components is not utilized, marked 
reductions in the total cycle costs would result by 
life extension of individual component until damage 
actually develops. To achieve such life extension 
without reducing equipment reliability requires 
reliable non-destructive inspection to detect de-
fects or damage development, fracture mechanics 
analysis and testing to evaluate the severity of 
any defects present under continued operation, and 
a quantitative method to select the accept/reject 
conditions for life extension. 
This paper will address four topics. First, 
it reviews briefly the basic concepts associated 
with probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM}, and 
retirement for cause (RFC}; second, it discusses 
some recent developments in these methodologies; 
third, it describes two specific examples which 
quantify the impact of inspection and analysis 
uncertainties on the optimum RFC strategy; and 
fourth, it summarizes progress to date on an 
ARPA sponsored project to evaluate RFC for 
application to gas turbine disks. 
BASIC CONCEPTS 
Fracture Mechanics - The conventional approach to 
life prediction involves establishing an allowable 
design life at which all such components are re-
moved from service. The fracture mechanics ap-
proach to life prediction differs from the conven-
tional approach in that it acknowledges that de-
fects are present or will develop and that failure 
will eventually occur by the gradual growth of 
cracks until they reach a critical size. The 
fracture mechanics design approach, therefore, 
establishes design allowables in terms of allowable 
defect sizes which cannot grow to a dangerous size 
between inspection intervals. 
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Fig. 1 Schematic representation of the distribu-
tion of actual failure lives compared to 
the nominal design life which is estab-
lished to assure that less than one in 
1.000 components develop a crack. 
In order to effectively implement the fracture 
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mechanics approach, Fig. 2 shows the various types 
of input required. Analysis, materials, and 
inspection input are all required. As in the con-
ventional design approach, the steady state, ther-
mal, and vibratory stresses must be identified at 
the critical locations. The crack path through 
the structure must be calculated and specifically 
the crack driving force, that is the crack tip 
stress intensity factor, K, must be evaluated as a 
function of increasing crack size. Finally, the 
critical crack size at which unstable fracture 
occurs or the crack size in which arrest of a 
growing crack occurs must be calculated. These 
analytical efforts utilize as input certain 
materials properties. Specifically the threshold 
below which high frequency fatigue (HFF) does not 
occur, the mode of crack propagation, and the 
materials crack growth law, either for fatigue or 
creep conditions, must be determined as a function 
of crack tip stress intensity factor, K, operating 
temperature, frequency, and other loading condi-
tions. The materials fracture toughness must also 
be determined and used to evaluate the critical 
crack sizes. Finally, the inspection input re-
quires definition of the flaw size range of con-
cern, the orientation and shape of flaws of con-
cern and an estimation of the probability that 
flaws of various size exists prior to inspection 
of the component. These three types of inputs are 
combined to perform the lifetime prediction. For 
example, the number of cycles to grow a fatigue 
crack to failure (NF) is calculated by taking the 
material crack growth law, rearranging and numer-
ically integrating from the initial flaw size (A;) 
to the final or critical crack size (Af) over the 
appropriate distribution of K as the crack grows. 
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Fig. 2 Probabilistic fracture mechanics approach 
to lifetime prediction. 
Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics- If each of the 
input parameters are assumed to be known exactly, 
we get an exact calculation of remaining life time. 
In practice, however, the input parameters are 
usually not known exactly; in fact, the uncertain-
ties vary considerably from one input to another. 
The probabilistic fracture mechanics approach 
(1,2) accepts uncertainties in the various input 
para.~eters, quantifies them, and calculates a 
failure probability as a function of continued 
operating time or cycles, rather than a precise 
remaining lifetime. The engineering community has 
generally accepted the fact that various input 
parameters are uncertain and that the probabilistic 
approach is more realistic than the deterministic 
life prediction. However, most design engineers 
do not fully understand the quantitative require-
ments and do not have the needed tools to actually 
implement a probabilistic fracture mechanics ap-
proach. The combination of this lack of under-
standing as well as lack of quantitative data 
on the specific uncertainties involved has limited 
the full implementation of probabilistic fracture 
mechanics to a few instances. 
Inspection Uncertainty - One of the key concepts 
which until recently limited the probabilistic 
analysis was a quantitative understanding of 
inspection uncertainty (3) and its impact on the 
reliability of the engineering component. More 
specifically, the inspector normally establishes 
an inspection level or sensitivity, shown as b 
on Fig. 3, and ideally the inspection .should 
locate all imperfections of size greater than S 
and not indicate the presence of any imperfections 
smaller than size S. In Fig. 3, this is 
quantitatively stated as the probability of 
rejection for various actual flaw sizes (a) at 
inspection level S [P(R/a, S)l. For an ideal 
inspection, P(rja,S) = l for crack sizes (a) 
bigger than S, and P(R/a, b) = 0 for crack sizes 
a < S. The typical eddy current inspection, like 
that used to inspect turbine disk bolt holes, is 
not perfect. As shown in Fig. 3, there is a finite 
probability of rejecting components with actual 
imperfections smaller than S, and a finite 
probability of not rejecting components with actual 
imperfections larger than S. Two other inspection 
methods are also shown on the same figure. That 
labeled A is an inspection method with the same 
sensitivity as the typical eddy current inspection, 
that is 50% of the time it rejects imperfections 
of size S; however, it has a reduced inspection 
uncertainty and more closely approaches the perfor-
mance of the ideal inspection which has 0 inspec-
tion uncertainty. The dotted line indicates the 
performance of inspection method A when utilized 
at a higher sensitivity but with the same inspec-
tion uncertainty. 
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Comparison of the inspection uncertainty, 
characterized by the probability of 
rejection as a function of flaw size, for 
ideal and real inspections. 
Preinspection Material Quality- Qualification of 
the flaws which may get into service requires 
quantification of both the inspection uncertainty 
and the distribution of flaws in the material 
prior to the inspection (1). Deterministic frac-
ture mechanics approaches have very conservatively 
assumed that the preinspection flaw frequency is 
larger for each crack size so that pn(a) l and 
the probability of flaw occurrence in the inspected 
part was exactly equal to the probability of the 
inspection missing a flaw of size a, if it exists, 
which is one minus the probability of rejection, 
P(R/a, S), given that a flaw of size a exists. 
More realistically, when the inspection procedures 
of Fig. 3 are applied to a component which initially 
contains a distribution pn{a) of imperfections of 
various size (a), the distribution of imperfection 
sizes after inspection is modified as shown in Fig. 
4. The ideal inspection would eliminate all imper-
fections of size greater than S, but with real in-
spections some larger imperfections will get into 
service and some components with smaller imperfec-
tion of no concern will be rejected and thereby 
increase the total costs. It is this probability 
distribut1on of imperfections after inspections, 
which is the product of the preinspection flaw 
distribution [en(a)] and inspection reliability 
[1 - P(R/a, S)J, that would be input as the pro-
bable initial flaw size {a·) for a probabilistic 
fracture mechanics ca1cu1al1on of failure proba-
bility. 
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The effect of various inspections on the 
distribution of imperfection sizes going 
into service. 
Retirement for Cause {RFCJ - A life extension 
strategy based upon retirement for cause rather 
than removal at a specified design life, can more 
completely utilize the available life of each com-
ponent l5). The RFC procedures may utilize either 
determinTstic or probabilistic fracture mechanics. 
In the determin1stic case, the non-destructive 
inspection defines the max1mum flaw size that could 
be missed and get into service; loading and stress 
analyses define the maximum cyclic and steady 
stresses in the areas of concern; and the deter-
ministic fracture mechanics analysis calculated 
the maximum amount of crack progression from the 
largest initial flaw that might occur under con-
tinued operation at conservative (nighest) cyclic 
and steady stresses. The RFC allowables are then 
established by selecting an appropriate safety 
factor based upon qual1tative engineering judgment. 
lhe probabilistic approach to RFC is similar, 
but 1nstead of a specified maximum flaw size, a 
probability of occurrence of various flaw sizes 
is specified. Simi Jarly instead of a maximum cyclic 
and steady stress, a probabi Jity distribution of 
various cyclic and steady stresses is input, and 
instead of a specific crack progression curve, the 
probabillstic fracture mechanics calculation yields 
a failure probability (reliability) as a function 
of time. Instead of a specific safety factor an 
appropriate accept/reject inspection size and 
inspection interval are selected to maintain a 
sufficiently low failure probability. 
Successful implementation of the probabilistic 
fracture mechanics approach requires extensive 
measurements to obtain the statistical data and 
develop the appropriate probability distributions 
for the inspection, the mission loads, the local 
stress concentrations, and the materials crack 
propagat1on and fracture toughness properties. 
Large deficiencies in any one of these input para-
meters will require utilizing a conservative upper 
bound and thereby reduce the life extension and 
payoff which results from implementing the RFC 
program. 
Combined Analysis - Life extension errors, which 
can reduce the effectiveness of RFC program, can 
be substantially negated with a modified RFC pro-
cedure which makes more direct use of past operating 
experience as reflected in the inspection informa-
tion to establish the RFC strategy. This modified 
approach is a logical outgrowth of a statistical 
engineering method called Combined Analysis which 
has been developed by Failure Analysis Associates 
(5-8). combined analysis (CA) utilizes the mini-
mum-amount of engineering modeling required to 
supplement the routine statistical analysis of 
actual in-service data on the frequency and sever-
ity of cracking, failures, and successes. Figure 5 
shows typical results for a hypothetical but realis-
tic population of turbine rotors. The conventional 
"design life" is established to assure an acceptably 
low failure rat~. A significant percentage of 
rotors (~ 10%) will be cracked but not failed 
while the balance will not even be cracked at the 
"design life". An RFC procedure based upon PFM 
would utilize a conservative calculation of tne 
distribution of crack propagation lives, Np. to 
establish allowables. TheCA approach would uti-
lize all available in-service data on Np and the 
initiation lives, Ni, along with laboratory data 
or engineering models which relate Ni, Np and Nf 
as shown in Fig. 5. As new service or test data 
reveal past errors in part usage (mission mix) 
or calculated ·stresses, theCA procedures contin~ 
ually and intrinsically account for them. Thus 
errors in the engineering model or materials data 
are not as critical in a CA/RFC life extension as 
with PFM/RFC because CA provides continual calibra-
tion with actual experience. The basic approach 
of incorporating a "fudge" factor in the design 
calculation to explain actual test and field exper-
ience is a common design approach. lhe CA approach 
simply provides a more formal and mathematically 
rigorous basis for 1ncorporating actual performance 
data into the life prediction. 
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the variability of initiation 
lives, propagation lives, and total cycles 
to failure for a hypothetical but realistic 
population of turbine rotors. 
An inspection-based CA/RFC procedure has been 
proposed which uses actual field data, such as the 
maximum apparent crack depth (a, measured non-
destructively), to calibrate the calculated remain-
ing life. As will be shown, life extension based 
upon the CA/RFC procedure is much more effective 
than purely analytical PFM/RFC because it is much 
less sensitive to analysis errors than PFM/RFC 
procedures which uses inspection only as a flaw 
screening device. 
Reliability/Cost Optimization - Whether the RFC 
system is based upon deterministic fracture mechan-
ics, probabilistic fracture mechanics, or combined 
analysis techniques, selection of the specific life 
extension strategy should be based upon optimiza-
tion of the relative cost and reliability associa-
ted with various options. Specifically the effects 
of realistic inspection, analysis, or usage uncer-
tainties must be quantified and incorporated in 
selection of the optimum life extension strategy. 
The following two sections provide examples 
which illustrate the basis concepts. 
TURBINE BLADE: SELECTION OF AN 
OPTIMUM INSPECTION REJECTION LEVEL 
The following quality assurance problem li) 
illustrates the use of inspection uncertainty, 
preinspection flaw frequency, probabilistic frac-
ture mechanics, combined analysis and reliability/ 
cost optimization concepts to select the optimum 
rejection level for inspections performed during 
manufacture of a population of gas turbine blades. 
Figure 6 summarizes the methodology applied in this 
example. The analysis inputs are: ll) the rejec-
tion probability as a function of inspection level (±J and imperfection size (a), (2) the flaw pre-
inspection flaw frequency (FF) as a function of 
imperfection size, (3) the conditional probability 
of failure given an imperfection of size a, \4) the 
manufacturing cost per blade, (5) the inspection 
cost per blade, and (6) the average cost per fail-
ure including the many indirect costs. Four methods 
have been identified for determining the flaw 
frequency; and three methods for determining the 
conditional failure probability, one of which is 
probabilistic fracture mechanics. In this example, 
the actual failure history is used to predict the 
probabi 1 ity of failure given a f 1 aw of size a 
rather than PFM analysis. 
Fig. 6. Combined analysis and inspection procedure 
to determine the optimum inspection size, 
which minimizes the total product cost. 
First, we consider the failure history. Assume 
that 100,000 blades have completed their design 
life, and lUO of the blades failure rrematurely. 
The fraction failed is then FF = 10- • The total 
cost of these 100 failures to the manufacturer, 
including estimated direct costs (e.g., customer 
relations), is estimated to be 10 million dollars. 
This given an average cost per failure CF = $100,000. 
The 100 failed blades are analyzed to deter-
mine the size of defect which initiated the failure, 
and the results are summarized in Table 1. A 
point estimate of the size distribution of defects 
which historically caused failure Pno \F,a,S0 ) is 
given in column three by dividing the number of 
initiating defects in each size interval by the 
interval size and the total volume of the material 
in the 105 blades, i.e., by dividing by 50 cm3 I 
_blade x lOS blades 1 10-1 em= 5 x lOS cm4 • 
The turbine blades before being admitted to 
service had to pass the historical inspection in 
which the inspection uncertainty was o = .2S + 0.1 em 
with the inspection size S = S0 = 3/4 em, and the 
rejection rate has been FRo = 4.5%. A sa~ple of 
lOU rejected blades were examined, and the imper-
fections in these blades which cause rejectable 
indications are summarized in Table c. A point 
estimate of pn0 ((a,S )IR), the size distribution 
of imperfections whicg cause rejection, given that 
the blade has been rejected, is given in column 
three of Table 2. It is obtained by dividing the 
number of rejectable indications in each imperfec-
tion size interval by the volume of the 100 blades 
and the interval ~ize, i.e., column two is divided 
by 1 00 b 1 a des x 50 cml /b 1 a de x 10-1 em = 500 em" . 
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Table 1. Hypothetical problem: Number of failure 
initiating flaws of various sizes in 100 
failed blades. 
Flaw Size Interval Number ~g~"Jol Flaw Size "a" in em of Flaws in em 
0.00-0.10 0 Q X 10-6 0.05 
0.10-0.20 0 0 X 10-6 0.15 
0.20-0.30 0 0 X 10-6 0.25 
0.30-0.40 0 0 X 10-6 0.35 
0.40-0.50 1 2 X 10-6 0.45 
0.50-0.60 7 14x10-6 0.55 
0.60-0.70 25 50 X 10-6 0.65 
0.70-0.80 36 72 X 10-6 0.75 
0.80-0.90 22 44 X 10-6 0.85 
0.90- 1.00 14 X 10-6 0.95 
1.00-1.10 4 X 10-6 1.05 
1.10- 1.20 0 Q X 10-6 1.15 
Table 2. Hypothetical problem: Number of rejectable 
indications in each flaw size range in 
100 rejected blades. 
Number 
Flaw Size Interval of Rejectable pn0;~"!~Rl flaw Size "a" 
in em Indications in em 
0.00- 1.10 16 32 X 10-3 0.05 
0.10-0.20 19 3Bx 10-3 0.15 
0.20-0.30 19 38 X 10-3 0.25 
0.30-0.40 17 34 X 10-3 0.35 
0.40-0.50 13 26 X 10-3 0.45 
0.50-0.60 9 18 X 10-3 0.55 
0.60-0.70 5 10 X 10-3 0.65 
0.70-0.80 3 6 X 10-3 0.75 
0.80-0.90 2 X 10-3 0.85 
0.90- 1.00 2 X 10-3 0.95 
Manufacturin and Ins ection Costs - lf the cost 
of manufacturing a blade is 100 plus an additional 
$10 to inspect the blade, the question is whether 
the total cost could be reduced by selecting a 
different inspection level (S). Using the data 
above as input, the dependence of the expectant 
cost per turbine blade upon inspection level \S) 
can be determined as indicated in Fig. 7. First 
the probable fraction of rejected blades is deter-
mined as a function of S. Assuming that the rejec-
tion probability for the historical inspection 
method has been determined to be 
il 
P 
0
(R I a.Sl = (li 0 (SJV2;)-l J exp [- (X-Sl 2/2o~ (Sl] dx ( 1) 
with the historical inspection method uncertainty 
given by 
o0 (S) = 0.25 + 0.1 em (2) 
the rejection probability for the specific inspec-
tion used on the 100,000 turbine blades (the his-
torical inspection method with s = 0.75} is given by 
a 
P
0
(R\(n,S
0
)) = (o 0 (S 0 whl- 1 J exp[-(X-S0 J2 /2o 0 2 (S 0 l] dx. 
\3) 
where S0 = 0.75 em. The probable fraction of re-jected blades if the historical inspection method 
is used is given by 
where 
co 
-PN (S) 
1-e RO (4) 
\e) 
VuFRo(S0 ) J [P0(R\(a,S)~ [P0 (Rj (a.S0 l]- 1pn 0 11a.S0 )jR) da. 
() 
FRo(S0 J = 0.045, Vu 50 cm3 , and pn ((a,S0 )IR) is given in Table z. 
The average cost to manufacture a turbine 
blade which passes the historical inspection method 
as a function of inspection level (S) is then 
given by 
(6) 
and is illustrated in Fig. 7. Here CM + C1 $110. 
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Inspection Size in em 
Total cost per turbine blade as a function 
of rejection level when the average cost 
of a failure is $100,000. 
Failure Costs - Next the probable fraction of blades 
which would fail is given by 
(7) 
where 
Here pn0 (F,a,S0 ) is given in Table 1, FRo(S) is 
calculated by Eq. 4, P0 (RI (a,S0 )) is given by Eq. 3, Po(RI (a,S)) is given by Eq. 1, Vu =50 cm3 , and 
FRo\So) = 0.045. The probable failure cost per 
blade in service as a function of inspection size 
is given by 
(9) 
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where CF = $100,000. This probable failure cost 
per blade is also·shown in Fig. 7. 
Inspection Level Optimization- The total expectant 
cost of a saleable turbine blade is the sum of 
average cost to manufacture a turbine blade which 
passes the inspection and the expectant cost due 
to the finite probability that the blade wi 11 fail. 
The total expectant cost per saleable blade is also 
illustrated in Fig. 7. lhe total expectant cost 
of a turbine blade if no inspection is conducted 
was calculated to be $328. It is evident from Fig. 
7 that the historical inspection level set by 
engineering judgment reduces the total cost of a 
saleable blade to $215. However, this analysis shows 
that the total expectant cost of a blade can be 
further reduced from the present cost of $215 per 
blade to $159 per blade by reducing the inspection 
size from the historical level of S = 0.75 em to 
S = 0.45 em. Over the 105 blades, this represents 
a potential additional savings of approximately b 
million dollars by simply adjusting the rejection 
level for an existing inspection. 
Now consider the optimum decision from the 
user rather than manufacturer's point of view. The 
user might experience an additional loss on the 
average of $900,000, which results from the fact 
that a blade failure forces the turbine out of 
service for an extended period of time. Hence the 
average failure cost to the user might be $1,000,000. 
Figure 8 illustrates the results of a similar opti-
mization analysis where the new expectant costs of 
a saleable blade is very high ($1,115 per blade) 
if the inspection size is left at the historical 
level. A change in inspection size from the histor-
ical level of 0.75 em to the level of 0.35 em will 
reduce the total expectant cost to the user of each 
blade to $234. 
Fig. 8. 
Inspection Size in em 
Total cost per turbine blade as a function 
of inspection rejection level when the· 
average cost of a failure is a million 
do 11 ars. 
Alternative inspection procedures with modified 
uncertainty have been \~) similarly evaluated to 
determine \1) the specif1c inspection level which 
produces the m1n1mum cost, and (2) the magnitude 
of the minimum cost relative to the historical 
blade inspection utilized at the level which pro-
duces minimum cost. lhe quantitative comparisons 
clearly show the importance of selecting the opti-
mum rejection level for the specific inspection 
and the importance of low inspection uncertainty, 
rather than high resolution alone, in minimizing 
the total cycle costs. 
TURBINE DISK: IMPACT OF ANALYSIS 
AND INSPECTION UNCERTAINTY ON 
LIFE EXTENSION STRATEGY 
FAA has developed analytical procedures (5-9) 
to evaluate the effectiveness of any proposed life 
extension procedure based upon retirement for cause 
(RFCJ, considering the in-service loading and ana-
lysis uncertainties as well as inspection uncertain-
ty. This evaluation procedure, a probabilistic 
simulation model, has been applied to a population 
of 10,000 gas turbine disks to determine the impact 
of 
a) Stress variations from disk to disk 
b) Unknown precise age of past usage of the 
disks 
c) Multiple (repeated) inspections rather 
than a single inspection 
d) Reduced inspection intervals, and 
e) Utilizing inspection results, through 
combined analysis (CAJ, rather than design 
calculations to establish RFC allowables. 
The effect of analysis and inspection uncertainty 
was,evaluted by considering the six hypothetical 
teams shown in Fig. 9. Each team consists of one 
analyst and one inspector of varying capabilities, 
and the total expectant cost savings possible through 
RFC procedures utilizing specific teams were com-
puted for 1000 disks, averaged, and compared. 
ANALYST I 
Derives correct general 
fatigue 100del but over-
estimates 11fe (at a given 
o ) by a factor of 3 by 
forgetting an important 
load spectrum or environ-
mental factor fn his lab 
tests. 
ANALYST 2 
Hakes fairly good crack 
growth rate estimate but 
doesn' t inc 1 ude crack 
initiation in model. 
ANALYST 3 
Develops perfect deter-
ministic fatigue model. 
INSPECTOR A INSPECTOR B 
Biased 1nspe.ct1on with Biased inspection with 
large uncertainty small uncertainty 
~~~tv ~ " Q "" " tf 
~@f 
TEAM 3A ~ TEP.'I 38 \ 
Fig. 9. Six hypothetical teams assigned to set a 
retirement-for-cause-based life limit for 
10,000 inspected turbine disks. 
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Fatigue Life Simulation- The total fatigue life to 
brittle failure of a disk when a life-limiting rim 
can be expressed generally as 
where 
Life to failure of the shortest-lived of 
all the (up to 100 or more) rim slots of 
the rotor (in units of cycles, time, 
inspection intervals, or design lives) 
Life to initiation of a crack of some 
small defined depth, a1, (a; = 0.001 inches in this report) 
Np =Life to propagate the crack from size a; 
to critical size for brittle failure, ac. 
The specific equation used to simulate in-
service fatigue life required for failure is given 
by 
(10) 
The equation used to relate the crack depth a to 
the number of applied load cycles N is 
where 
with 
( ll) 
a = Crack depth (greater than a ) 
N =Number of vendor-specified design lives 
required to produce a crack of depth a 
Nf =Dimensionless life expressed as the 
number of "worst-case" predicted retire-
ment lives required for failure (i.e., 
a rotor with Nf = 7 would fail after 
seven times the predicted life) 
a = Effective alternative* nominal stress at 
the crack locus in ksi (treated as a random 
variable) 
Cp = Parameters (treated as random variables) 
which simulate the variation of crack 
initiation and crack growth, respectively, 
at a given a, as caused by geometric var-
iables such as surface roughness and 
metallurgical variables such as local hard-
ness or composition, and 
(12) 
Critical stress intensity factor expressed 
in ksi (in.) 112 (treated as a random 
variable). 
The form of (10) and (ll) and the numerical values 
of the parameters have been selected for simplicity 
and because they are representative of observed 
fatigue performance of certain gas and steam turbine 
*Steady stress effects are assumed to be negligible 
in this example. Refer to (iJ for an RFC procedure 
that considers the relative contribution of steady 
and alternating sources. 
rotor rims. 
The exponent 3 in Eq. 12 accounts for the 
stress decrease below the crack surface (an expo-
nent of 2 would be correct for certain crack geo-
metries subject to uniform stress), and the factor 
2.5 (with inherent units of in. 116 * to make Eq. 3 
dimensionally correct) is representative of the 
results of a stress intensity factor analysis of 
the rim crack geometry. 
The cumulative probability distribution of 
Ci is assumed to be log-normal so that log Ci is 
a Gaussian or normally distributed variable. The 
selected parameters of this normal distribution 
are·a mean or median of 10 and a standard devia-
tion of 0.2. These assumptions about the proba-
bility distribution of log Ci can be compacted 
into the notation 
or 
log Ci = GAU (10,0.2) 
c. = 10GAU(l0, 0.2)ksi6** 1 
( 13) 
( 14) 
The other assumed probability distributions are 
given by 
C = 10GAU(5.0, 0. l)ksi3 p 
a= GAU (40 ksi, 5 ksi) 
( 15) 
(16) 
Kc = GAU (100 ksi (in) 112 , 15 ksi (in) 112 )*** 
( 17) 
Figure 10 shows the probability distribution 
for inspectors A and B and Fig. ll that for the 
operating stress (a) given by (16). Considerable 
rotor-to-rotor stress variation has been assumed.**** 
This stress variation might result from aircraft 
mission differences which produce different in-
service, thermomechanical transients. 
Equations 10 through 17 and the numerical 
values of their parameters have been chosen to 
simulate many characteristics of real in-service 
fatigue performance. These include: a greater 
effect of stress on initiation life (exponent of 
6) than on crack growth life (exponent of 3), 
greater scatter in initiation than in crack growth 
at a given a (~qs. 14 and 15), and a realistic, 
smaller increase in crack growth rate with crack 
depth for a crack in a stress concentration than 
for one under uniform stress. 
*l in. .0254 m 
**l ksi 6.894 x 106 Pa = b.894 N/mw 
***l ksi (in) 112 = 34.745 Nmm-312 
****The coefficient of variation V0 for the stress distribution is equal to 5/40 or 12.5%. 
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Figure 5 presents the simulated life-to-
failure Nf (also N; and Npl data for 10,000 rotors* 
obtained by applying the Monte Carlo simulation 
computer program in (£) to Eqs. 10 through 17. 
The results show that crack propagation, N , con-
trols the early part of the Nf probabilitypdistri-
bution and crack initiation the later part (N > 20). 
Furthermore, significant fatigue life scatter 
occurs and the first few failures occur between 
N = 1, the design life, and N = 1.5. This is inten-
ded to simulate a good initial life prediction or 
design analysis resulting in neither failure nor 
severe overdesign. 
Actual Crack Depth at Inspection Time N - The 
actual crack size at at the actual insp~ction time 
Ntis solved from tll) as 
log at = (Nt - Ci/o6 ) (cf /CP) + log a1 (18) 
For further discussion, it is of interest to 
note that at the median values (Nt = 1, Ci : 1010 , 
and Cp ,. Hf ). a 7% to 8% change in o wi 11 change 
at by a factor of approximately three. Thus, for 
each in-service rotor, an inspection error of a 
factor of three in the estimate of crack depth 
is equivalent to a 7% to 8% analysis error in the 
effective nominal alternating stress. 
*These results, from an earlier 10,000 rotor simu-
lation (l), also accurately represent the results 
of the present 1000 rotor simulation. 
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Apparent Crack Depth from Inspection Nt - The in-
spection uncertainty is simulated by calculating 
apparent crack depth from 
~=maximum (.001", 8rnspl (19) 
\<fhere arnsp is deri~ed solely from the caliilrate:d 
1nspect1on s1gnal g1ven by 
log (8rnsp/a ) = GAU (b,u) l20} 
where b, taken to be either 0.1 or 0.2, reflects 
positive bias in the inspection (for example, b = 
.1 implies that typically the crack size will be 
overestimated by a factor of 10' 1 = 1.26). This 
bias could reflect conservative procedures or the 
fact that multiple rim slots create more change 
for a high, rather than low, estimate of the rotor's 
maximum value of at. Finally, u, taken to be 
either 0.2 or 0.4, is the "logarithmic standard 
deviation" of arnsp/at and reflects inspection 
uncertainty in a s,milar manner as in (12). Eq. 
20 is plotted in Fig. 10 for the two sets of para-
meters b and u, corresponding to inspectors A and 
B. Inspector A has available a relatively poor 
technique with large bias and uncertainty, while 
Inspector B has less bias and uncertainty. 
Analysis Uncertainty - Three hypothetical analysts 
are considered. Analyst 1 uses the equation 
Nf = 3 x W 0 !If + W log (8c/ .001}/&' (21) 
to model the fatigue process. By comparing Eq. 21 
to Eqs. 10,11, and 23, one can see that the form 
of Eq. 21 is correct, but that, on average, Eq. 21 
will overpredict the median failure life by a factor 
of three. Such an error could be due, for example, 
to the use of inappropriate temperatures for lab-
oratory fatigue tests. 
Analyst 2 uses the equation 
Rf = .333 x 101 " /86 + .333 x W log (3c/ .001 )/&' 
(22) 
to model the fatigue process. On the average, this 
analyst underpredicts life by a factor of three. 
The third analyst develops a near-perfect 
deterministic model of the fatigue process that 
corresponds closely to the median life. Analyst 
3's equation is 
It has been assumed that the -analysts have 
included all relevant failure modes in their assess-
ments. For example, the effect of a larger-than-
anticipated vibratory stress could cause the effec-
tive critical crack depth to be limited by high fre-
quency fatigue threshold rather than the material's 
fracture toughness. The turbine history, destruc-
tive metallographic examination of rim slots, and 
rotor-inspection data can be used to determine if 
vibratory stresses affect ac and Nf significantly. 
Cost Analysis - The RFC procedures described above 
have been programmed into a Monte Carlo simulation 
program which simulated 1000 individual rotors for 
each RFC procedure and team. The program does the 
following for each rotor: (I) generates" in-service" 
fatigue data, (2) performs a chosen RFC procedure 
on each rotor at the appropriate time and makes 
random errors using the probability distribution 
input and other 'appropriate equations, and (3) 
checks for failure of the rotor. Costs are assigned 
to the various outcomes of the RFC procedure for 
the jth rotor. Each time the rotor is inspected, 
a negative dollar gain (cost) of 
Gji = -2000 dollars 
is assigned. Each time the life of the rotor is 
extended, a gain of 
Gje = 20,000 N'e dollars 
is assigned, where $20,000 is the original cost 
of a rotor designed for one life unit and N'e is 
the perceived amount of life extension until either 
the next inspection, retirement, or failure, which-
ever occurs. Should a failure occur before the 
rotor is retired, a negative gain (cost) of 
Gjf = -1,500,000 dollars 
is assigned. 
Clearly, the estimation of the expected cost 
of failure Gf is a complex, controversial subject 
(6,9, 10, ll) that touches on a variety of sensitive 
safet~ economic, and political issues. However, 
Gf is finite, and the failure probability is greater 
than zero and to insist otherwise is unrealistic 
and impractical. If specification of Gf is unde~ 
sirable, a maximum allowable failure probability 
can be specified instead of built into the RFC 
procedure constraints. This failure probability 
could be specified and justified by using several 
comparative criteria. For example, the failure pro-
bability may be acceptable if it is less than the 
in-service failure probabilities demonstrated during 
the design life of similar equipment accepted by 
society for general usage. For further discussion 
of the "how safe is safe enough" question, the 
reader is referred to the work of Starr (10) and 
Tetelman (.!.!). -
The total RFC cost savings for each rotor is 
obtained by summing 
Gj = fiGji + feGje + ffGjf 
(Repeated indices do not denote summation) 
where fi, fe, ff represent the number of incidents 
for each type of cost gain for the jth rotor. 
The expected average dollar gain per rotor 
of the RFC procedure is then estimated by averaging 
all the simulations 
1000 
G = E G./1000. j=l J 
G is a measure of the RFC performance. The rms 
error of the G estimate (i.e.,_the sampling toler-
ance or standard deviation of GJ due to the use of 
the finite number of rotor simulations (1000) is 
estimated to be $2000 near the optimum safety 
factor, where the simulated failure probability 
is of the order of .001. Thus, the curves reflect 
the simulated procedure with an accuracy of appro-
ximately ±2000 dollars. 
lSCl 
RFC Evaluation Results -The average dollar gain 
(cost savings) G for each RFC procedure and analyst/ 
inspector team was computed. Typical results are 
summarized by Figs. 12-14 and discussed below. 
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Fig. 12. Expected dollar gain per rotor for single 
and multiple inspection RFC procedures· 
with various analysis and inspection 
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Fig. 13. Effect of uncertain past usage on expected 
dollar gain per rotor for multiple in-
spection RFC procedure. 
Fig. 14. Comparison of the expected cost savings 
per rotor with RFC procedures utilizing 
various stress input. 
Single Inspection vs. Multiple Inspection -
The G results for Cases A and B, single and multi-
ple inspection-based-stress RFC procedures, res-
pectively, are displayed in Fig. 12. Three conclu-
sions are evident: (1) an optimum safety factor 
exists for each team within each case, (2) the teams 
with the better inspectors do consistently better 
than their less able counterparts although even 
the less accurate inspectors can still achieve sub-
stantlal cost savings, and \3) provided that the 
safety factor is between 2 and 3, the multiple 
inspection RFC procedure is substantially better 
than the single inspection procedure. 
The general shape of the G curve is due to the 
trade-off between premature failures and premature 
retirement. The optimum safety factor represents 
the best balance between these two competing effects 
and corresponds to simulated failure rates of the 
order of one_failure in 1000 rotors. The sharp 
drop in the G curves on the low SF end corresponds 
to too many failures. The gradual drop in the G 
curves on the high SF end represents the cost of an 
increasing number of premature rotor retirements. 
Figure 12 shows that the optimum safety factor 
is, unfortunately, a strong function of the analy-
tical model. Since we assume that little or no 
knowledge of analysis error is· available prior to 
formulation of'the RFC procedure, there seems little 
chance to choose accurateiy an optimum safety factor. 
The situation would be significantly worse, however, 
if the minimum inspection interval was 1 rather than 
l/2 times the d2sign life as .!!_Sed. lhis computation 
showed an abrupt decrease in G at high SF values 
due to exsessive premature retirement~ caused be a 
minimum inspection intervai that is too large. The 
results showed that reduced inspection interval 
reduces the sensitivity to SF, as long as SF is 
chosen large enough to prevent failures. Furthermore, 
if an appropriately small minimum inspection inter-
val is used, safety factors between 2.0 and 3.0 
produce very substantial economic gains for all 
teams using the multiple inspection procedure. 
It should be noted that none of the RFC pro-
cedures studied thus far have taken into account 
information received from either other rotors or 
earlier inspections of the same rotor. Thus, 
neither the analyst nor the inspector is allowed 
to learn from past experience. This simplification 
in the model is particularly unfair to the multiple 
inspection inspector who is made to ignore the 
results of previous inspections each time the rotor 
is reinspected. 
Known vs. Estimated Component Age and Inspec-
tion Interval - It is quite likely that an analyst 
will not know exactly how many design lives have 
actually been used at the time of inspection. 
Figure 13 shows the_relatively small effect of this 
uncertainty on the G results of the multiple in-
spection, CA/RFC procedure applied by Team 3B. The 
three usage uncertainties evaluated were: 
l) Exact knowledge of Nt (S = 0) 
2) A small deviation of Nt from Nt (factor 
of 1.2 (S = 0.8), i.e., 20% error or less, 
68% of the time) 
3) A large deviation of Nt from Nt {factor 
of 2 error or less (S = 0.50), 68% of the 
time) 
Design-Based-Stress \PFM) vs. Inspection-Based 
Stress \CAJ/RFC Procedures - The results of using a 
single best estimate design stress in Eq. 11 rather 
than a stress calculated from inspection information 
is shown in Fig. 14. lhe results in Fig. 14 are 
for a rotor population with realistic actual stress 
variations from rotor to rotor (a larger variation 
has been assumed throughout the rest of this study). 
The figure shows that the design-based procedure 
does reasonably well provided that the analyst 
chooses the correct stress value. Note, however, 
that if to~ high or too low a stress value is chosen, 
very poor G results are obtai ned, even 1~ith Team 3B, 
the best team. Thus, the inspection-based-str~ss 
RFC procedure is much more likely to produce sub-
stantial economic gains than the design-based pro-
cedure. 
SUMr~ARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study h~ve led to the fol-
lowing general conclusions: 
l) It is evident that even with large inspec-
tion and analysis uncertainties, cost 
effective rotor life extension at extremely 
low failure probabilities can be effected 
using a Retirement-For-Cause {RFC) proce-
dure which makes full use of in-service 
structural fatigue data. 
2) Any proposed RFC procedure should be sub-jected to a parametric probabilistic evalua-
tion using realistic simulated data to 
evaluate the procedure and to learn which 
areas of analysis, experiment, logistics: 
and inspection are most critical to the 
success of the RFC procedure. 
3) Computer simulation of the fatigue crack 
initiation and growth process provides a 
viable means for evaluating the effect of 
both systematic and stochastic errors upon 
the payoff potential of an RFC procedure. 
4) A more effective CA/RFC procedure would be 
based on probabilistic rather than deter-
ministic life extension calculations and 
would make use of information obtained 
from other rotors and previous inspections 
of the same rotor. 
A number of conclusions have been reached for 
the specific RFC example described. They are: 
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1) Life based safety factors of 2 to 3 will 
result in substantial economic gains with 
little chance of producing an unacceptably 
large number of failures if the CA/RFC pro-
cedure uses a stress value which is cal-
culated ffom the inspection results, and 
if the minimum inspection interval is suffi-
-ciently small. 
2) With regard to subcritical crack growth life, 
knowledge of the maximum crack depth to 
within a factor of three is equivalent to 
knowledge of the effective stress to within 
8%. 
3) Larger economic gain results from an RFC 
procedure which uses stress values calcu-
lated from inspection results rather than 
conventtonally calculated stress values. 
4) Multiple inspection RFC procedures are at 
least twice as effective as single in-
spection procedures if a safety factor 
of 2 to 3 is used. 
5) Uncertainty regarding the age at inspec-
tion has little effect on the overall 
results of the RFC procedure, per se, but 
may lead to early failures before the 
first scheduled RFC inspection. 
6) Shortening the length of the minimum in-
spection interval in multiple inspection 
procedures can substantially reduce the 
overall cost due to premature retirements. 
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